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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-RETROACTIVE RE­
LIEF DENIED IN TITLE VII VIOLATION-City of Los Angeles, De­
partment of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
The Equal Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,1 prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 Among the reme­
dies which were created to implement the purposes of the Act is 
section 706(g), available to individuals injured by employer discrimi­
nation. 3 After an individual exhausts the appropriate adminis­
trative remedies4 and a federal district court makes a finding of dis­
crimination,5 section 706(g) authorizes the trial court to enjoin the 
discriminatory practice and order appropriate relief to individuals. 
Appropriate relief includes reinstatement or hiring, with or without 
backpay.6 
Backpay and similar retroactive relief, awarded to victims of 
employer discrimination, are intended to compensate individuals 
for monetary losses directly traceable to discriminatory practices. 7 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976). The present statute incorporates the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). 
3. ld. § 2000e-5(g). 
4. ld. § 2000e-4 provides for the creation of the Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Commission (EEOC), which has limited powers of conciliation and intervention 
in civil suits brought under Title VII. Once a charge is filed by or on behalf of a per­
son claiming to be aggrieved under Title VII, the EEOC serves notice of the charges 
on the charged party and conducts an investigation of the complaint. If the EEOC 
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe the truth of the charge "the 
Commission shaIl endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." ld. § 
2000e-5(b). If the EEOC is unable to secure compliance it has the authority to bring 
a civil action against the party. If the charged party is a government, governmental 
agency, or political subdivision and the EEOC has been unsuccessful at securing 
compliance with Title VII, the EEOC will refer the case to the Attorney General 
who may bring an action in federal district court. If the EEOC or the Justice Depart­
ment fails to file a civil action or dismisses the charge, the person claiming to be ag­
grieved may file a civil action within 90 days of the individual's notice of the action 
taken by the Justice Department or the EEOC. ld. § 2000e-5(f). 
5. ld. § 2000e-5(g). The remedy provision may be applied after a finding by the 
court "that the res,Pondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging 
in an unlawful employment practice...." See text accompanying notes 44-48 infra. 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
7. The remedy of back pay is usually viewed as a grant to the district courts of 
the equitable power, restorative in nature, to fashion the most complete relief possi­
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The purpose of this relief under Title VII is twofold. 8 First, it is in­
tended to make victims of discriminatory employment practices 
whole by compensating them for losses suffered. Second, the relief 
is intended to eradicate discrimination by discouraging discrimina­
tory employment practices. 
Courts applying section 706(g) have used a variety of standards 
to determine whether backpay should be granted. Results of the 
section's application have differed depending on how the courts 
weigh various equitable factors and how they interpret the legisla­
tive intent underlying the Act. 9 The United States Supreme Court 
provided lower courts with guidelines for applying section 706(g) 
and with standards to measure the appropriateness of an award of 
backpay. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,10 the Court set forth a 
strong presumption favoring backpay awards to be applied by trial 
courts deciding employment discrimination cases. l1 Recently, how­
ever, in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. 
Manhart,12 the Supreme Court again addressed the appropriate­
ness of a district court's award of retroactive relief, this time re­
versing the award of backpay. The Manhart decision complicated 
the application of standards for awarding retroactive relief that 
were established in Albemarle. Recognizing the confusion caused 
by Manhart, this note will analyze the problem of construing sec­
tion 706(g) and propose standards by which future awards of retro­
active relief should be made. 
On June 5, 1973, Marie Manhart and other female em­
ployees13 of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power filed 
ble. See Note, Retroactive Seniority as a Remedy for Past Discrimination: Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 181, 190 (1976). Some commen­
tators classify backpay as a legal remedy, awarded when a claimant proves he or she 
has suffered loss of income as a result of an unlawful employment practice. See 
Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 
7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 495, 514-15 (1966). 
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971), where the Supreme 
Court stated: "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from 
the language of the statute." The Court has consistently recognized the Congres­
sional purposes which are inherent in the language of Title VII. See also Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody,422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,800 (1973). 
9. See text accompanying notes 41-54 infra. 
10. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
11. See text accompanying notes 55-63 infra. 
12. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
13. The plaintiffs included Marie Manhart, a former employee of the depart­
ment; four other named present employees of the department; the Committee to Pro­
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charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
alleging violations of Title VII;14 Female employees of the depart­
ment were required to contribute 14.84 percent higher monthly 
contributions to a pension plan1s than were males of comparable 
age, length of service, and salary. IS Plaintiffs claimed that this plan 
discriminated against women employees in violation of the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964. 17 After an investigation of the com­
plaint by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the 
Justice Department, the plaintiffs sought an injunction in federal 
district court to compel the department to cease requiring discrimi­
natory contributions. IS 
The district court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, 
holding that the unequal contributions to the mandatory retirement 
plan violated Title VII.19 The court also granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on their claim and awarded retroact­
ive relief. The backpay award, measured by computing the differ­
ence between the amounts female employees and male employees 
were required to contribute to the plan, was granted to restore to 
the female employees monies lost as a result of the Title VII viola­
tion. 2o 
tect Women's Retirement Benefits Association, composed of female supervisory em­
ployees of the department; and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local Union No. 18, an unincorporated labor union whose members included 
women employed by the department. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at B-9, City of 
Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
14. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581, 
584 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978). 
15. The pension plan is officially referred to as the Public Employees Retire­
ment, Disability and Death Benefit Plan. All employees of the department were re­
quired to participate in th~ plan, which was funded and managed by the department. 
Each employee made monthly contributions which were matched 1l0% by the de­
partment. Id. at 583. 
16. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at B-lO. 
17. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581, 
584 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978). 
18. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 387 F. Supp. 
980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in 
part, 435 U.S. 405 (1975). For procedures followed, see note 4 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
19. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 387 F. Supp. 
980, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated 
in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978). The district court rejected the defendant department's 
argument that the longevity tables were based on "a factor other than sex" which 
would bring the unequal contributions under an exception to the Equal Pay Act, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (1978). 
20. For the district'court's determination of the appropriate award, see Petition­
er's Brief for Certiorari at B-9-1O. The court awarded the female employees retro­
active relief of their excess contributions to the plan made between April 5, 1974 and 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af­
firmed the district court's decision in Manhart. 21 In reviewing the 
district court's award of retroactive relief, the appellate court bal­
anced "the merits of the plaintiff's claim and the public policy be­
hind it . . . against the hardship on a good faith employer. "22 The 
court found that the equities favored reimbursement of the female 
employees' unequal contributions to the pension plan and, there­
fore, upheld the grant of retroactive relief. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' de­
terminations that the pension plan violated Title VII by discrimi­
nating against female employees as a class. 23 The Court, however, 
reversed the award of retroactive relief, denying the appellees re­
imbursement of their disproportionate and excessive contributions 
to the pension plan. 24 Despite recognizing that section 706(g) fa­
vors restoring economic status to victims of employment discrimi-
December 31, 1974. April 5, 1974 was the date that the EEOC amended its regula­
tions, stating in 29 C.F.R. 1604.9(e) (1977) that the fact that the cost of benefits "is 
greater with respect to one sex than the other" is not a defense to an action based on 
sex discrimination under Title VII. The Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power discontinued the unequal contributions requirement on December 31, 1974 in 
response to CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1979), which directed any city 
with a population of over one million to revise existing pension plans so that individ­
uals of the same age contributed equally without regard to sex. The statute was ef­
fective as ofJanuary 1, 1975. 
21. 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), afI'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405 
(1978). The court refused the appellant's petition for a rehearing in light of the re­
cently released Supreme Court decision, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 
(1976). There the Court held that an employee benefit plan which did not provide 
coverage for pregnancy was not an unfair employment practice prohibited by Title 
VII. 
22. 553 F.2d at 591. The court applies the test developed in Schaeffer v. San 
Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (1972): "In the case of damages of this na­
ture, a court must balance the various equities between the parties and decide upon 
a result which is consistent with the purpose of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act, and the fundamental concepts of fairness." Id. at 1007. 
23. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in which a majority of the Court 
concurred. Justices Stewart, White, and Powell concurred in full. Chief Justice 
Burger, with Justice Rehnquist joining his opinion, concurred in the Court's denial 
of retroactive relief but dissented from the finding that the plan violated Title VII. 
Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's finding of a violation of Title VII, 
preferring a posture which would have recognized and resolved the conflict between 
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and Manhart, and concurred in the 
denial of the backpay award. Justice Marshall found the retirement plan to violate 
Title VII and dissented from the Court's holding denying relief to those plaintiffs af­
fected by the plan. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of the case. 
24. 435 U.S. at 718-23. The Court found that the differences in contributions re­
quired under the plan violated Title VII by discriminating against individual female 
employees because of classwide predictions of longevity. Even if the longevity cal­
culations were accurate, the Court held that the policy behind Title VII precluded 
employers from treating individuals differently because of a class generalization. 
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nation and that backpay should normally be awarded, the Court 
denied relief. It focused on the hardships that reimbursement 
would cause the employer.25 In analyzing the appropriateness of 
this denial, it is necessary to examine the legislative history behind 
Title VII and its remedial provisions. 
On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed into law the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 26 This Act was designed to give statutory force 
to the constitutional protections afforded to blacks after the Civil 
War.27 The legislation was intended to eradicate discrimination by 
assuring that blacks would not be hindered from full participation 
in sOciety.28 One of the provisions included in the Act was Title 
VII, which restricted employers of twenty-five or more employ­
ees29 from discrimination based not only on color, but also on the 
classifications of religion, sex,30 and national origin. 31 
To aid in carrying out the purpose of Title VII, Congress en­
acted section 706(g). The section provided for injunctions to elimi­
nate particular discriminatory practices and backpay and rein­
statement to compensate individuals for losses suffered because of 
25. See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra. 
26. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000a-2000h (1976)). 
27. See llO CONGo REC. 15865 (1964) (concise explanation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Chronology of Congressional Action submitted by Senator Humphrey). 
See also Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431 
(1966); Note, Standards Governing Backpay Awards for Violations of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,61 CORNELL L. REV. 460,462-65 (1976). 
28. On June 19, 1963 President Kennedy addressed Congress regarding the im­
portance of the then pending Civil Rights legislation in a message to the House of 
Representatives. Referring to the employment provision, Kennedy stated, in part: 
Raciai discrimination in employment is especially injurious both to its 
victims and to the national economy. It results in a great waste of human re­
sources and creates serious community problems. It is, moreover, inconsis­
tent with the democratic principle that no man should be denied employ­
ment commensurate with his abilities because of race or creed or ancestry. 
109 CONGo REc. 3248 (1963). 
29. The 1972 amendments to the Act made Title VII applicable to employers of 
15 or more employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). 
30. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, an opponent of the civil rights 
legislation, offered a last minute addition proposing an amendment to Title VII 
which would make the Act applicable to sex discrimination in employment. llO 
CONGo REC. 2577 (1964). A number of commentators have stated, and their views are 
supported by the legislative record, that this amendment was introduced to block the 
passage of Title VII. See Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex 
Classifications in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1216-17 (1974); Lines, 
Sex Based Fringe Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 489, 499-500 (1977-1978). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). 
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discriminatory practices. 32 The legislative history of the remedy 
provision clearly emphasizes the compensatory purpose of the re­
lief: "[T]he scope of relief . . . is intended to make the victims of 
unlawful discrimination whole . . . restored to the position where 
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimina­
tion. "33 The focus of section 706(g), therefore, is not concerned 
with the hardships on the employer, but with the restoration of the 
economic status of the victims of discrimination. 34 
The importance of the make-whole intent inherent in section 
706(g) can be better understood by comparing it to the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).35 The legislative history of Title VII 
documents that section 706(g) was modeled after the remedies sec­
tion 10(c) of the NLRA.36 Section lO(c) directs the National Labor 
Relations Board "to take such affirmative action including rein­
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate 
the policies of this subchapter. "37 In enacting section 706(g) of Title 
VII, Congress directed the courts to look to judicial interpetation 
of lO(c) for criteria to determine the appropriateness of rein­
statement, backpay, and other affirmative action. 
The judicial interpretations of the remedies provision in lO(c) 
of the NLRA reinforce the Congressional intent that section 706(g) 
have a restorative function. Under the NLRA, awards of backpay 
have been liberally granted with the remedy viewed as "a repara­
tion order designed to vindicate the public policy of the statute by 
32. Id. § 2000e-5(g) provides: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... 
an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin the respondent 
... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in­
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or 
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appro­
priate. 
33. 118 CONGo REc. 7166-69 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746 by 
House and Senate Conferees). The 1972 amendments to Title VII provided Congress 
with an opportunity to review the purposes of § 706(g). In that review, Congress 
made clear that the intent of § 706(g) was to give the courts the discretion "to make 
the victims of unlawful discrimination whole." Id. at 7168. 
34. If back pay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the 
remedy would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a com­
pensation for workers' injuries. This would read the 'make whole' purpose 
right out of Title VII, for a worker's injury is no less real simply because his 
employer did not inflict it in 'bad faith: 
422 U.S. at 422. 
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). 
36. See 110 CONGo REC. 7214 (1964) (interpretative memorandum of Senators 
Clark and Case); 110 CONGo REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). 
1979] TITLE VII RETROACTIVE RELIEF 785 
making the employees whole for losses suffered on account of an 
unfair labor practice. "38 The Supreme Court has stressed the im­
portance of backpay awards under the NLRA in "restoring the eco­
nomic status quo" of victims of discriminatory employment prac­
tices. 39 The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have 
consistently upheld the importance of backpay as a remedy for 
compensating victims of discrimination for monies lost due to illegal 
employment practices. 40 
Despite the Congressional intent to award backpay to victims 
of Title VII violations, judicial interpretation of the appropriateness 
of these awards under the Act has been inconsistent. 41 Section 
706(g) lends itself to a variety of interpretations, since it grants the 
district courts discretion to award the appropriate relief. Rather 
than specifically directing the courts to award relief, the statute 
states that the courts "may" award the relief which they deem "ap­
propriate. "42 The Supreme Court in Albemarle recognized the dis­
cretionary powers vested in the district courts and stated that the 
courts applying the provision should be guided by sound· legal 
principles consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Act. 43 
One reason for the inconsistent application of section 706(g) is 
the judicial confusion over whether the employer's culpability in 
fostering the employment discrimination should be a factor in 
determining relief. 44 Congress clearly stated that only "inadvertent 
or accidental discrimination will not violate the title or result in en­
38. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952). The Court there reviewed the 
recovery available under the provisions of § lO(c) of the NLRA In that case the 
Court held that the Board's order requiring an employer to pay backpay was a prova­
ble claim in bankruptcy and that the Board, rather than the bankruptcy court, should 
liquidate the claim. 
39. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969). The Supreme 
Court in that case upheld the NLRB's order granting reinstatement and backpay to 
strikers who had been denied reinstatement to their former positions. The NLRB 
computed individual back pay awards, which the court of appeals had modified. 
40. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 244, 346 (1953). 
41. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), 
afJ'd in parl, rev'd. in parl, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller 
Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 
1972); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); 
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), 
cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th 
Cir. 1969). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
43. 422 U.S. at 417-18. 
44. See Note, supra note 27. 
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try of court orders."45 Some courts had interpreted the application 
of section 706(g) to involve a balancing test in which the employer's 
"good faith" efforts to abide by the laws are reviewed. When the 
courts found that there had been good faith, they used it as justifi­
cation for denying relief. 46 The Supreme Court, however, has held 
that the employer's "good intent or bad intent" is not relevant to 
finding discrimination under Title VIIY Further" it has implicitly 
suggested that intent is not relevant in awarding relief under the 
remedies section since "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to 
the consequences of the employment practices not simply the mo­
tivation. "48 
Many of the circuit courts of appeal have reviewed awards of 
backpay under the "special circumstances" test which closely fol­
lows the Congressional intent in the enactment of section 706(g).49 
Courts supporting the "special circumstances" test emphasize the 
importance of backpay in terminating discrimination and making 
the victims of the discriminatory employment practices whole. This 
test presumes that backpay should be awarded to victims of em­
ployment discrimination and directs the district courts to refuse to 
grant backpay relief only in "special circumstances." Few courts 
applying this test have actually defined situations in which such 
special circumstances are present. 50 The practical effect of the 
45. 110 CONGo REC. 12723-24 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey discussing 
changes in Title VII and § 706(g)). 
46. Good faith is not a defense to a finding of a violation of Title VII, but it is 
often viewed as a factor which might limit the remedies available to the defendant. 
See Note, supra note 27, at 466. The Court in Albemarle stated that "bad faith" is 
not a sufficient reason for denying backpay. Where an employer has shown 
bad faith-by maintaining a practice which he knew to be illegal or of 
highly questionable legality-he can make no claims whatsoever on the 
Chancellor's conscience. But, under Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith 
simply opens the door to equity; it does not depress the scales in the em­
ployer's favor. 
422 U.S. at 422. 
47. Griggs V. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (court held that high 
school diploma requirement and general intelligence test were not job related and 
violated the rights of black employees under Title VII). 
48. Id. 
49. The "special circumstances" standard for backpay under Title VII was ap­
plied in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (re­
versed denial of backpay award based on employer's good faith) afI'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978) (remanded denial of backpay to determine 
award under presumption favoring back pay), and Bowe V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
416 F.2d 711 (7th CiT. 1969) (remanded denial of backpay to women discriminated 
against in job classifications and plant seniority). 
50. In Pettway V. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 253 (5th Cir. 
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"special circumstances" test has been that employees who have suf­
fered financially from discriminatory employment practices have 
been granted relief uniformly. 51 
Retroactive relief under Title VII has also been reviewed un­
der a standard of equitable balancing which generally fails to carry 
out the Congressional intent. Under this approach, the courts bal­
ance the merits of individual claims for relief against the economic 
hardships which such relief would impose on the employer. 52 Fac­
tors which often weigh in favor of the employer include good faith 
attempts by employers to rectifY discrimination and employer's re­
liance on statutes and regulations condoning discrimination. 53 Such 
balancing often leads to a denial of retroactive relief to employees 
and fails to make them whole. 54 
The Supreme Court, by reviewing Albemarle, seized an op­
portunity to interpret the provisions of section 706(g) and to re­
solve the conflict among the circuits. In this case, black employees 
1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), the court rejected 
past good faith of the company and the possibility of future violations as not being 
"special circumstances" which would justify denial of backpay. In Head v. Timken 
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973), the court rejected good faith of the 
employer as a "special circumstance" which would justify denial of relief. But see 
Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court 
denied backpay because the employer relied on a state protective statute. 
51. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), 
afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller 
Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
52. In Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of backpay and di­
rected the district court to balance "the various equities between the parties and de­
cide upon a result which is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Act, and the fundamental concepts of fairness." [d. at 1006. In 
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972), the court 
also applied a balancing test, determining that an award of backpay was inappropri­
ate because the employer was acting in good faith and the practices were in accord 
with state protective laws. 
53. State protective statutes have often been relied on by employers to elude 
the sanctions of Title VII. State protective statutes are state laws which restrict the 
working conditions, hours, and wages of female employees. In Manhart, the Su­
preme Court states that Albemarle does not require backpay to be awarded automat­
ically. 435 U.S. at 719 n.35. One of the areas which the Court notes may justify de­
nial of relief is employer reliance on a state protective statute. The Manhart Court 
noted that Albemarle reserved the question of whether this reliance would save a 
defendant from liability. See 422 U.S. at 423 n.18. 
54. See Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); 
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. 
Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972); Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970). 
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of the Albemarle· Paper Company in Roanoke Rapids, North Caro­
lina filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission alleging discriminatory employment practices in viola­
tion of Title VII. 55 The employees charged that the company's use 
of personality tests and educational requirements was not job­
related and was used to restrict minority hiring and promotions. 
The district court found that the company's testing programs and 
seniority system violated Title VII. The court refused, however, to 
grant backpay. It reasoned that the employer's good faith and the 
employees' delay in requesting relief justified the denial. 56 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
judgment of the district court regarding the retroactive relief, and 
ruled that backpay should have been granted. 57 The court held 
that denying backpay based on the employer's lack of bad faith was 
inappropriate. 58 It rejected the district court's application of a bal­
ancing test in which the hardships of the employer would be 
weighed against the individuals' economic loss. The court enjoined 
the discriminatory testing practice and upheld a presumption in fa­
vor of backpay to be awarded to "a plaintiff or a complaining class 
who is successful in obtaining an injunction under Title VII . . . 
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. "59 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Albemarle to deter­
mine, among other issues,60 the standards by which awards of back­
pay should be governed. Implicitly, the Court adopted the "special 
circumstances" test by restricting the denial of backpay awards to 
situations which "would not frustrate the central statutory purposes 
of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making 
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."61 
This presumption, referred to by the Court in Manhart as the 
"Albemarle presumption,"62 focuses on the importance of restoring 
55. 422 U.S. at 408. 
56. 474 F.2d 134, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
57. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that because of the 
strong Congressional policy behind backpay awards and the compensatory nature of 
the awards, backpay should be granted in all but unusual circumstances. Id. at 142. 
58. Id. at 141. 
59. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted). 
60. The Court also addressed the issue of what an employer must show to "es­
tablish that pre-employment tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not in in­
tent, are sufficiently 'job related' to survive challenge under Title VII." 422 U.S. at 
408. 
61. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted). 
62. 435 U.S. at 719. 
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the economic status of the employee, rather than mitigating the 
hardships of the employer. 63 
Courts have subsequently reinforced the standards laid out in 
Albemarle and applied the presumption in favor of backpay awards 
which was asserted in that case. 64 The United States Supreme 
Court, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 65 applied the 
Albemarle standards and reversed the lower court decision which 
denied seniority relief to victims of discrimination. The Court held 
that the make-whole purpose behind section 706(g) extended to 
seniority rights of employees. 66 It failed to find merit in the de­
fendant company's argument that the award of seniority relief 
would conflict with the economic interests of the other employ­
ees. 67 The Court stated that a denial which was based on potential 
harm to other employees would frustrate the central make-whole 
objective of Title VII. 68 
In reviewing the retroactive relief awarded by the lower courts 
to the female employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power, the Supreme Court in Manhart recognized the validity 
of the Albemarle presumption favoring retroactive relief. N everthe­
63. 422 U.S. at 419-22. The Supreme Court directed the lower courts to recog­
nize the purposes of Title VII and to deny backpay only for reasons which will not 
frustrate the purposes of the Act. The Court stated that it was "necessary, therefore, 
that if a district court does decline to award backpay, it carefully articulate its rea­
sons." Id. at 421 n.14 and accompanying text. 
64. In Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, (7th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reinforced 
the Albemarle presumption and directed the district court to follow three general 
mechanical rules when reviewing computation of backpay awards: "(I) unrealistic 
exactitude is not required; (2) ambiguities in what an employee or group of employ­
ees would have earned but for discrimination should be resolved against the discrim­
inating employer; (3) the district court . . . must be granted wide discretion in 
resolving ambiguities." Id. at 452. 
65. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
66. Id. at 774. 
67. Id. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting from the majority opinion, found that 
"competitive type-seniority relief" would be an inappropriate and inequitable award 
because innocent employees would be harmed. Burger recommended that a more 
equitable remedy would be a monetary award to the victims of discrimination. Id. at 
781. In Manhart, although the victims actually suffered loss of wages and there was 
no claim that innocent employees would be harmed by the award, Burger joined in 
denying relief. 435 U.S. at 725. 
Justice Powell, dissenting, admonished the Court for diminishing the importance 
of the discretionary power of the district court to fashion appropriate relief under § 
706(g). 424 U.S. at 794. Powell also joined the Court's decision in Manhart, which 
overturned the district court's determination of relief and failed to remand the issue. 
435 U.S. at 723. 
68. Id. at 771. 
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less, other factors were deemed more compelling, and the Court 
reversed the district court's award of backpay.69 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court, did not focus on the importance of econom­
ically restoring the status of the victims of discrimination as pro­
vided by section 706(g). Rather, he emphasized the inequities that 
an award of backpay would entail. 
A number of factors, according to the Court, favored denying 
retroactive relief to the plaintiff employees. First, the confusing 
state of administrative regulations pertaining to employment dis­
crimination created a morass which might justify the employer 
requiring unequal contributions to the pension plan. 70 Next, an 
award of backpay would create a precedent which, if applied to 
similar plans throughout the country, would adversely affect the 
nation's economy.71 Finally, an award of backpay to the female em­
ployees who contributed excessively to the plan might jeopardize 
the economic stability of the plan in Manhart and result in harm to 
all the beneficiaries. 72 The Court stressed that the economic hard­
69. Id. at 723. 
70. 435 U.S. at 720 n.37. The EEOC guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)-(f) 
(1977), required equal benefits. The Wage and Hour Administration regulations, 29 
C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1977), only required an employer to equalize his or her em­
ployee contributions or benefits. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, in 41 
C.F.R. § 60.20.3(c) (1977), adhered to the Wage and Hour Administration's position. 
Until recently, it has been difficult to ascertain which governmental unit had the re­
sponsibility for enforcement of the federal equal employment laws. Prior to the ap­
proval of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 prepared by the President and trans­
mitted to the Senate and House of Representatives, 14 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. 405 
(Feb. 27, 1978), 18 governmental units exercised responsibilities under statutes, ex­
ecutive orders, and administrative regulations. The Reorganization Plan provides 
for the EEOC to become the primary agency in the area of job discrimination, with 
the Department of Labor relinquishing many of its responsibilities. The implementa­
tion of this Plan is intended to eliminate the conflicting agency regulations in the 
employment discrimination area. 
71. The Court noted that "[fJifty million Americans participate in retirement 
plans other than Social Security. The assets held in trust for these employees are 
vast and growing-more than $400 billion were reserved for retirement benefits at 
the end of 1976 and reserves are increasing by almost $50 billion a year." 435 U.S. at 
721 (footnotes omitted). In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 
2724 (1978), the Supreme Court cited Manhart to stress the importance of economic 
stability and the element of reliance which is vital to the funding of pension plans. 
The Court held that the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violated 
the contract clause by retroactively modifying the compensation which the employer 
agreed to pay to employees. 
72. The Court speculated that if the plaintiffs' contributions were recovered 
from the pension fund "the administrators of the fund will be forced to meet 
unchanged obligations with diminished assets." 435 U.S. at 723. If this happened, 
the Court foresaw that the "expectations of all retired employees will be disap­
pointed or current employees will be forced to pay not only for their own future se­
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ships to the employer would not serve the goal of eradicating dis­
crimination under the Act. 73 Although a backpay award in this case 
might not advance the statutory purpose of eliminating discrimina­
tion,74 the Court failed to properly review the denial in terms of 
the make-whole purpose of the Act. These factors alone are not 
sufficient to justify denial of the female employees' claims for 
restitutionary relief. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting from the denial of backpay relief 
in Manhart, did not find the majority's arguments persuasive. He 
failed to find that the confusion in the administrative regulations 
justified denying relief to the female employees and believed that 
during the three-year liability period the administrators of the plan 
should have recognized that the unequal contribution requirement 
violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guide­
lines. 75 Marshall also noted the Court's fear of the potential im­
pact that such an award would have on the nation's economy. 
He recognized that none of the parties had claimed that the award 
would threaten the plan's solvency and argued that the Court 
should have restricted its review to the case at hand. 76 Marshall 
also rejected as unfounded the Court's fear that an award would re­
sult in harm to innocent employees. 77 Marshall's analysis of the 
curity but also for the unanticipated reduction in the contributions of past employ­
ees." Id. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). 
73. Id. at 722-23. 
74. Id. at 720. The Court stated: "There is no reason to believe that the threat 
of a backpay award is needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices 
to conform to this decision." Id. 
75. The Manhart Court found that even assuming that the EEOC's guidelines 
should have put the department on notice that the unequal contributions were ille­
gal, the date chosen by the district court to determine liability was too early. Id. at 
719 n.36. Marshall states that even if the 1972 date was too early for determining lia­
bility "during the nearly three year period involved," from April 5, 1972, the date 
the EEOC regulations were issued, until December 31, 1974, the date the depart­
ment changed to an equal contribution plan, "there surely was some point at which 
'conscientious and intelligent administrators' ... should have responded to the 
EEOC guidelines." [d. at 730. 
76. Id. at 730-32. 
77. Id. at 732. The Supreme Court previously decided that the harmful effect 
that backpay would have on employees not victims of the discriminatory employ­
ment practices was not relevant in determining relief appropriate under Title VII. 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 V.S. 747 (1976). The Court in Franks found 
"untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be denied merely because the 
interests of other employees may thereby be affected." Id. at 775. The Equal Pay 
Act, 29 V.S.C.A. §206(d)(I) (1978), prohibits employers from reducing the wage rate 
of any employee in order to comply with the provisions of that Act. See also CAL. 
GOV'T CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1975), which expressly prohibits unequal contribu­
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award reveals that the factors relied on by the Court to justify de­
nial of the award were insufficient to compel denial of backpay. 
The Court's emphasis on the "equitable nature of the Title VII 
remedies"78 and focus on the hardships of the employer appear 
misplaced in Manhart. The intent of the Act as well as the 
Albemarle presumption justify granting an award of backpay to 
those female employees who had contributed nearly fifteen percent 
more than did comparable male employees. Manhart inadequately 
deals with the "central statutory purpose of Title VII,"79 making 
persons whole for losses suffered as a result of employment dis­
crimination. 8o The female employees' claim for relief is "more 
compelling" in this case than in many other backpay situations, 
since the plaintiffs in Manhart actually received less pay for the 
work they performed. This differs from the situation in which the 
person who is granted backpay receives wages for a period when 
he or she is not working. 81 Certainly, an award of backpay in this 
situation would serve the statutory make-whole purpose of Title 
VII. 82 
In addition to minimizing the importance of restoring the eco­
nomic status of the victims of discriminatory employment practices, 
Manhart fails to grant proper review to the claim for relief. Prior 
to this case, an appellate court reviewing a lower court decision re­
garding retroactive relief under Title VII and finding error in the 
award would remand the case for a factual determination of the ap­
propriateness of the award. 83 Manhart should have been remanded 
for further findings to support or deny the backpay relief.84 There 
tions, states that increases in the contributions required of members of the plan are 
not authorized by the statute. 
78. 435 U.S. at 719 (footnote omitted). 
79. 422 U.S. at 421. 
80. Moroze, Back Pay Awards: A Remedy Under Executive Order 11246, 22 
BUFFALO L. REV. 439 (1973); Morse, Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,46 TEX. L. REV. 517 (1968). 
81. 435 U.S. at 733. 
82. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra. 
83. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,780 (1976); Albemarle Pa­
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
494 F.2d 211, 267 (5th Cir. 1974) afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 
1978); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1972); 
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969). 
84. The lower court decisions inadequately address the appropriateness of the 
backpay award. Retroactive relief is discussed in Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Cer­
tiorari at 28-35, Petitioners' Opening Brief at 37-46 and Respondents' Brief at 55-59, 
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
None of the amici briefs prepared by insurance-related groups addressed the issue of 
retroactive relief and the harm such relief might impose on the industry. 
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was no record of factual determinations by the district court re­
garding computation of the award, and, moreover, the issue of ret­
roactive relief was insufficiently briefed and argued in the lower 
courtS. 85 The Court usurped the district court's role as factfinder 
by refusing to remand the determinations of relief. Consequently, 
the Court minimized the importance of the trial court's discretion 
to determine the relief appropriate under section 706(g). 
Manhart does little to effectuate the intent of section 706(g) in 
particular and Title VII in general. The Court refused to return the 
female employees who were discriminated against to their proper 
economic status. By reviewing the award in terms of the hardships 
to the employer and the potential impact on the nation's economy, 
the Court failed to implement the purposes for which section 
706(g) was enacted. Title VII is not only intended to discourage 
discriminatory employment practices, but also, more important, 
to make-whole individuals who experienced discrimination. To 
achieve these statutory goals courts must emphasize the strength of 
the Albemarle presumption which favors awarding backpay relief. 
The continuing validity of this presumption mandates that the 
Manhart rationale not extend beyond the unique facts of the case. 
The goals of Title VII will not be achieved unless those injured by 
employment discrimination are restored to the economic status 
which they would have enjoyed under nondiscriminatory circum­
stances. 
Marcia R. Conrad 
85. The only record of the determinations of the district court may be seen in 
the conclusions of law which were filed with the district court decision granting an 
injunction to the department employees. See Petitioner's Brip.f for Certiorari at 
B-11-12. 
